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HEGELIAN DIMENSIONS OF THE SECOND SEX:
A FEMINIST CONSIDERATION
Simone de Beauvoir' s philosophical analysis of alterity in The
Second Sex represents an ambitious feminist attempt to target the
problem ofwomen's otherness and discover the means by which
women can overcome this secondary status. Beauvoir's project,
motivated by her desire for women to gain access to the privileges of
men---especially, to attain what she deerns the ultimate privilege of men
within arealm where women are trapped in immanence:
transcendence-falls short of this aim. Further, it exhibits, in Kristevan
terms, a "logic of identification" with dominant logical and ontological
values ("Women' s" 19) insofar as Beauvoir' s text, at the same time that
it interrogates these values, discloses its indebtedness to masculinist
philosophy and its major paradigms. Far from diminishing the
tremendous impact The Second Sex has had on feminist scholarship,
however, these factors have given an impetus to ongoing debates.
Beauvoir's undertaking, thus, remains a relevant and generative project
more than fifty years later, as feminist thinkers continue to explore key
issues such as the terms of the desired transcendence and the inevitable
implicatedness of feminisms' relationship with the writings of
traditional, masculinist philosophers.
One crucial component of Beauvoir' s engagement with
phallogocentric thought which has inspired a virtual wellspring of
recent scholarly discussion is her Hegelian project. 1 While it is true
1 In an article originally published in French in 1994, MicheIe Le
Doeuff notes the influence of HegeIon Beauvoir' s thought and, in
particular, on The Second Sex; Le Doeuff claims that the text is "a
prolongation of the reading of Hegel already used as an epigraph to She
Came To Stay" ("Sirnone" 64), which reads: "Chaque conscience
poursuit la mort de l'autre," or "Each conscience seeks the death of the
other." This claim marks a shift in the tide of Beauvoir scholarship
(away from its univocal consideration of Beauvoir's Sartrean
dimensions). Recent scholarly investigations into the relationship
between Beauvoir' s thought and that of Hegel include those by Tina
Chanter, Edward Fullbrook and Kate Fullbrook, Eva Lundgren-Gothlin,
and Elaine P. Miller-all ofwhich contain vital insights into the
relationship between Beauvoir and Hegel, rather than Beauvoir and
Sartre. Patricia Jagentowitcz Mills suggests that contemporary
feminisms' concern with Hegel, in fact, began when "Beauvoir
that Beauvoir relies heavily on Sartrean notions of the self, the
development of which seems to have been a mutually informed project,2
she transposes Sartrean categories onto a Hegelian model of the self-
alienated spirit. Beauvoir' s engagement with Hegelian philosophy,
thus, yields a notion of consciousness as dualistic and leads to the
assertion that the action of consciousness itself constitutes a set of
oppositional, conflictual social relations because the self, or the subject,
defines hirnself in relation to others as objects. This self-other
schematic, central to The Second Sex, proves to have limiting
consequences for the concept of otherness as a liberating force.
Further, through her use of key moments from Hegel' s mastertext, The
Phenomenology ofSpirit, namely, the meeting of human and divine law
in the ethical world and the infamous and oft-misused master-slave
dialectic, Beauvoir illustrates how women'ls alterity, as she conceives it,
frustrates women' s project of transcendence.3
This essay will illustrate how Beauvoir' sattempt, however
Hdevious,,,4 to cultivate the potential within male philosophical systems
creatively appropriated parts of [Hegel' s] philosophy for the
development of her analysis of woman as Other in The Second Sex" (2).
2Scholars who have documented the mutual influence of Beauvoir and
Sartre on each other's intellectual work include, among others: Debra
Bergoffen, Fullbrook and Fullbrook, Sara Heinämaa, Sonia Kruks,
MicheIe Le Doeuff (Hipparchia's), Eva Lundgren-Gothlin, Margaret
Simons (HBeauvoir' s Early"; HBeauvoir' s Philosophieal"), and Karen
Vintges. Fullbrook and Fullbrook as weIl as Simons have been
instrumental in not only examining the reciprocal relationship between
these two thinkers but also highlighting Beauvoir' s influence on Sartre.
Of particular significance is Beauvoir' s origination of the theme, Hthe
opposition of self and other" (Simons, HBeauvoir'l s Early" 186;
Benjamin xi).
3 Elaine P. Miller suggests that nonconflictual models of human
intersubjectivity and human existence emerge from reading The Second
Sex in conjunction with The Ethics ofAmbiguity; however, I intend to
examine the ways in which Beauvoir' s Hegelian project functions
productively in The Second Sex itself.
4 Linda M. G. Zerilli asserts, as do I, that Beauvoir Hspeaks deviously"
in the words of dominant discourse, revealing absurdity and dissonance,
as weIl as conuption, in masculinist cultural assumptions and
philosophical conclusions about women. Zerilli states, H... Beauvoir
does not hand women over to the fatalism of teleological narratives [ ..
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in her design for a liberating feminist philosophy, particularly her
utilization of a dualistic, oppositional conception of consciousness,
which she derives from her reading of Hegel, ultimately thwarts the
theory of alterity she develops in The Second Sex, if her aim is indeed
women' s transcendence. However, an analysis of Beauvoir' s project-
especially her consideration of certain pivotal philosophical moments
from the Phenomenology-reveals much more than a limited,
historically conditioned perspective, including Beauvoir' s problematic
commitment to the male philosophies that influenced her own
intellectual identity: Through her engagement with key Hegelian
paradigms and narratives, Beauvoir succeeds in targeting
phallogocentric thought at its core, setting ideas in motion, and
ultimately creating conceptual spaces for the projects of future
feminists. Her impressive study lays the groundwork that has not only
informed future feminist strategies but itself transgresses generational
boundaries offeminist thought.5 This is a subject which demands
further scholarly attention as weIl as a deep appreciation for the legacy
she has inspired. But before embarking on this task, abrief
consideration of what is involved in the engagement of
masterdiscourses will perhaps help to contextualize Beauvoir' s
undertaking.
Introduction: Engaging MasterdiscourseslEngaging Hegel
The exclusion of women and "minorities" from history and the
masterdiscourses of philosophical tradition poses achallenge to
feminist theory and philosophy: it does not seem possible to employ the
tools of patriarchy for feminist ends. Further, it may seem reasonable,
or even necessary, for feminisms to reject a philosophical past built
upon this fact of exclusion and invested in the perpetuation of
patriarchy, as weIl as other systems of domination. However, the
.] but, rather, writes into the dominant sacred and secular narratives a
struggle that decisively alters their meanings" (118-19). The self-
serving misrepresentations inherent in masculinist discourse are
challenged by Beauvoir's (at times mimetic) discursive strategy of
engagement.
5 Several feminist readings of Beauvoir have demonstrated a
commitment to liberating her from the constraining category of the
"first generation" and its singular concern for the "politics of equality,"
such as Emily Zakin's reading ofBeauvoir which establishes that "there
is good reason to recognize Beauvoir as on the vanguard of the third
generation" (109).
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possibility of dispensing with these texts and paradigms seems
implausible. These ideas and constructs are intertwined with our
thoughts, language, and perceptions, and they are embedded in our
social ideals, political structures, and the fabric of our everyday
existence. There is little likelihood of completely surpassing our
philosophical inheritance. Yet, even if this were feasible, we must
question the efficacy of such an enterprise.
While a complete rejection of our intellectual forebears is
difficult to imagine, we may consider an antagonistic relationship,
which might consist of an interrogation of philosophical texts, insofar as
they have excluded and devalued women and other marginalized
groups, and a denunciation of such texts for their phaIlocratic and
hegemonic content. However, while critique is, indeed, a crucial
component of any brand of cultural or sociopolitical theory, this activity
is limited in its scope and effects, and not simply because it is
intrinsically implicated by these texts. By contrast, the enactment of
engagement as a strategy takes into account the inescapably impure
relationship of feminisms with mastertexts, and it also acknowledges
the possibility that there are valuable resources within the problematic
assortment of texts and ideas comprising philosophical tradition, a fact
which did not escape the attention of Simone de Beauvoir and continues
to occupy the projects of committed feminisms.
Contemporary feminists have demonstrated that a
simultaneous invocation of philosophical tradition and refusal of
discursive authority, a self-conscious and self-critical maneuver, makes
it possible to invoke voices from the phallocentric philosophical past in
order to locate tools for radical transformation. In a complex exchange
with patriarchal philosophical tradition, the writings of contemporary
figures, such as Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva, respond to the
masterdiscourses of this tradition as weIl as build upon moments therein
that exceed themselves. Their reappraisals and consequent
appropriations prove that whether a text is feminist or patriarchal
depends on contexts, users, uses, and effects and that, due to the many
possible readings and applications of mastertexts, it is possible that
traditional texts may be established as provisional, momentary feminist
texts or resources. This is, naturaIly, a source of feminist controversy.
However, a decidedly irreverent posture and an insistence on remaining
mobile distinguish these projects from mere appropriations. This type
of engagement cultivates a necessarily "impure," reflective, and
mediated relation to philosophical origins.
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Feminisms' engagement with phallogocentric thought may be
traced historically by its repeated return to Hege!. The rationale behind
this consistent engagement may be the powerful influence Hegel has
had on intellectual history, or perhaps the potential Hegel' s work may
provide for those who read against the grain of his thought. I do not
wish to assert that Beauvoir consistently maintains a position of
conscious defiance to the historical and philosophical perspectives of
her intellectual forebears, including Hege!. Nor will I claim that she
simply appropriates Hegelian philosophy. Rather, by exploring the
intersection of a central text in feminist philosophy, The Second Sex,
and a dominant narrative within the masterdiscourses of philosophical
tradition, Hegers dialectic in the Phenomenology, and by examining
the limitations and excesses that result, the philosophical complexities
surrounding the strategy of engagement can be partially illuminated,
and we may begin to ascertain how the resources of engagement may be
turned against phallocentric thought and even used to reconfigure
theorizing itself. The dynamic economies of possibility that best
counter and displace the effects of patriarchy may, in fact, emerge from
this mode of interaction which privileges negotiation, reciprocity, and
mediation. Therefore, the relationship between feminist texts and
"patriarchal texts" (symbolic texts/those of the dominant order, or
hegemony) may itself syrrlbolize the efforts of feminisms to transcend
hierarchical power relationships in both theory and practice. What is
privileged here is a form of continuous struggle, or negotiation between
forces, which, if enacted on a grand world-historicallevel, holds
promise for an array of radical political enterprises.
Beauvoir's Hegelian Dialectic
Thus, Beauvoir's use of Hegel in The Second Sex establishes
her project as a historical precursor to the strategies of contemporary
feminists who consistently revisit Hegers Phenomenology as a site of
contention.6 In her text, Beauvoir chronicles the passage of feminist
6 Notable examples are: Kristeva's implementation of Hegelian
negativity in her text, Revolution in Poetic Language, where negativity
becomes a disruptive force within the symbolic rather than a force
which drives dialectical movement towards ideational closure or unity,
and lrigaray's treatment of Hegers reading of Antigone in her essay,
"The Etemal Irony of the Community," where she exposes Hegel' s
ethical order as a rationale for masculine knowledges. lrigaray
continues to engage with the phallic economy and masculinist concepts
of the Hegelian dialectic in her more recent work on the universal as
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consciousness through a project of negation and transformation, a
dialectical movement of consciousness towards the aim of
transcendence similar to the movement of Spirit in Hege!' s
Phenomenology. In her appropriation of the Hegelian dialectic,
Beauvoir presents women' s consciousness not as a simple reflection on
extemal material conditions or an acute perception of astate of affairs
intolerable to women, but as a dialectical relationship between
consciousness and concrete circumstances wherein conditions are
revealed as contradictions. This leads to an apprehension of possibility,
a crucial advance towards gaining power. In itself, this process of
feminist consciousness is insufficient for the kind of transformation
necessary for women' s transcendence, but it leads to the search for the
means of overcoming conditions--existing both in the world and within
women-which support oppressive structures and to the development
of direct forms of struggle against those structures.
Beauvoir may have implemented Hegel's philosophical
apparatus because she found that his concept of historical change, the
continuous struggle toward a higher principle of freedom, illuminated
the nature of freedom. Or perhaps, like Marx, she believed that the
revolutionary aspects of this ideological justification of patriarchy and
philosophical hegemony could be tumed against the systems it
perpetuates. In any case, Beauvoir does not overtly illustrate how the
Hegelian system contains both philosophical potential and the very
principles against which women must struggle, as she does with Freud,
for example, in her section on Psychoanalysis.7 And, unlike her
mediation and the universal as two in Sexes and Genealogies, je, tu,
nous, and I Love ToYou.
7 In Chapter 11, "The Psychoanalytic Point of View," Beauvoir
acknowledges both the valuable insights and the inherent flaws in
Freudian psychoanalytic theory. She derives her "essential objections"
to the psychoanalytic point of view "from the fact that Freud based it
upon a masculine model" (41). Thus, Beauvoir critiques the masculine
biases in Freudian psychoanalysis and ultimately identifies a rationale
for male domination therein. Yet she incorporates her extensive and
sophisticated knowledge of psychoanalysis throughout her text. One
example is her reading of errlbodied subjectivity in Part IV, "The
Formative Years," where her apprehension of the phallus as a symbolic
rather than a genital reality factors into her analysis of how the girl does
not experience her difference as a lack, but "finds herself situated in the
world differently from the boy" (Beauvoir 272).
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feminist successors, she does not explicitly interrogate the tools of the
Phenomenology. Yet her own moments of excess-beyond the bounds
of her "first wave" status and standard readings of her work-provide
vital material for later projects, the full consequences of which have yet
to be explored.
Beauvoir's Concept of Otherness
In answer to the question, "what is a woman?" Simone de
Beauvoir confrontationally recites the Latin phrase for "woman is a
womb," thus beginning her discussion of the category of the Other and
her exposition of her theory of alterity in the introduction to The Second
Sex (xxv).8 This identification of woman' s status as a sexual and
reproductive being proves insufficient, however, for the location of
femininity, which Beauvoir deerns the basic defining attribute of
woman. Femininity, according to Beauvoir, is not a biological fact, nor
is it a metaphysical essence, although she identifies biology as a cmcial
factor of woman' s status within the spheres of philosophical and
cultural mythology and locates therein a variety of attempts to reify
woman into a Platonic essence on these grounds. Beauvoir cites
Aristotle' s claim, "The female is a female by virtue of a certain lack of
qualities ... we should regard the female nature as afflicted with a
8 All Beauvoir citations will be references to the Parshley translation of
The Second Sex, a much-contested translation, to be sure, but the most
widely implemented English version of Beauvoir' s text to date,
resulting in its extensive proliferation within D.S. academic circles.
Luise Von Flotow's article, "Translation Effects: How Beauvoir Talks
Sex in English," points to the voluminous critiques of the Parshley
translation of The Second Sex, as well as other French to English
translations of Beauvoir' s work, highlighting the misogyny that is
inserted and the philosophical overtones that are erased by translation
effects. While selective abridgement and other key translation issues do
distort the character of this text, and there are many who vigorously
attempt to get at the "real" text or the "source text perspective," as Von
Flotow puts it, the fact remains that the Parshley text is prominently
used, even in the graduate classroom, and comes to represent
Beauvoir's views to a large-scale audience. Therefore, despite the ways
in which the text is altered to reflect both the translator' s own sexism
and the publisher' s pandering to the perceived tastes of a mid-twentieth
century audience, the study of this text is worthwhile, including its
translation effects, which have themselves provided a fruitful source of
academic criticism and philosophical critique.
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natural defectiveness," as weH as St. Thomas' pronouncement of
woman as an "imperfect man," and an "incidental" being, the symbolic
representation of which resides, she explains, "in Genesis where Eve is
depicted as made from ... 'a supemumerary bone' of Adam" (xxviii).
Thus, she begins her elucidation of the "secondary, derivative
ontological status" of the Other (Simons, "Beauvoir and Sartre" 172).
That woman is essentiaHy a sexed being within these spheres
factors profoundly into Beauvoir' s provisional construction of the
categories of Self and Other. She asserts, "And she is simply what man
decrees; thus she is caHed 'the sex,' by which is meant that she appears
essentiaHy to the male as a sexual being. For him she is sex-absolute
sex, no less. She is defined and differentiated with reference to man
and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as
opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute-she is
the Other" (Beauvoir xxviii). This binary does not, however, trap
woman, "the etemal feminine," in the subordinate component of
Cartesian dualism, but it does differentiate her according to her sexed
identity. Beauvoir and later French feminists, such as Luce Irigaray, in
fact, maintain differentiation as a key facet to reciprocity between
subjects.
There is no symmetry between the sexes in the self-other
dichotomy, but there is an opposition, nonetheless; and it is an
opposition without reciprocity. Beauvoir states, "In actuality the
relation of the two sexes is not quite like that of two electrical poles, for
man represents both the positive and the neutral, as is indicated by the
common use of man to designate human beings in general; whereas
woman represents only the negative, defined by limiting criteria,
without reciprocity" (xxvii). Furthermore, she explains, "It amounts to
this: just as for the ancients there was an absolute vertical with
reference to which the oblique was defined, so there is an absolute
human type, the masculine. Woman has ovaries, a uterus; these
peculiarities imprison her in subjectivity, circumscribe her within the
limits of her own nature. It is often said that she thinks with her glands"
(xxvii). Thus, there is "no peculiarity" in being a man (xxvii), but being
a woman implies a derivative, "peculiar" human status. In Beauvoir' s
schema, the differentiation between sexed identities correlates with the
differentiation in the sphere of gender. In her view, women are indeed
trapped by biology, but only because the concepts of masculine and
feminine have effected this entrapment. Yet Beauvoir ultimately blurs
the sexlgender lines, since she does not attempt to establish either
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biology or sexual identity as natural "facts" any less influenced than
gender by mythologies and other social forces.
Beauvoir' s reading of gender takes shape within her discussion
of alternative modes of oppression. She finds the category of the Other
useful not only in her conceptualization of relations between the sexes,
but in her understanding of the trends of dominant groups to establish
patterns of racism, classism, nationalism, and imperialism. She remarks
on the tendency of coherent groups to establish their primacy as the One
and construct a group of hostile "others" on the outside: "... no group
ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the Other over
against itself;" she claims, "If three travelers chance to occupy the same
compartment, that is enough to make vaguely hostile 'others' out of all
the rest of the passengers on the train" (Beauvoir xxix).
With the construction of these hierarchies, Beauvoir asserts,
there is always a corresponding belief system comprised of an elaborate
system of justification. She notes, "... whether it is arace, a caste, a
class, or a sex that is reduced to a position of inferiority, the methods of
justification are the same" (xxxv). The dominant class bases its
superiority and the inferiority of the Other on a set of ideas of its own
creation. Thus, the masculine consists of whatever is valued by
patriarchal ruling powers, and the feminine entails whatever is
devalorized in phallocracy. Like "the good Negro," to quote her
phrase, who is submissive, childlike, and jovial, the "truly feminine"
woman plays her role as it has been revealed through dominant
ideology: "that is, frivolous, infantile, irresponsible-the submissive
woman" (xxxvi).
Although Beauvoir locates the One/Other binary in other
categories besides the sexes, she does not proclaim these various
oppressions to be identical or comparable. Firstly, the situation of
woman as other is an anomalous oppression in that it applies to a group
that comprises approximately half of humanity. Usually, Beauvoir
comments, "... privilege depends upon inequality of numbers-the
majority imposes its rule upon the minority or persecutes it" (xxx).
Thus, the sweeping nature of women' s oppression distinguishes it.
Secondly, this oppression depends on the elusive factor of femininity,
which is at least in part a construction emanating from patriarchy' s
rationale for domination. Therefore, Beauvoir remarks that women do
not and cannot use "we" in the sense that other oppressed groups do.
As a result of the ideological underpinnings of women' s secondary
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status, she claims that women "... do not authentically assurne a
subjective attitude" (xxxi). Beauvoir finds that women, dispersed
among men and infused with male ideology, lack the means, or the
basis, for organizing.9 Thirdly, there was no event that occurred to
cause women's othemess; and since it is not a condition arising from a
particular social or historical change, it is not a situation that can be
duly reversed. She notes, "A condition brought about at a certain time
can be abolished at some other time, ... ; but it might seem that a
natural condition is beyond the possibility of change" (xxx-xxxi).
Therefore, not only is the state of affairs sweeping and non-episodic,
but conditions, including the existence of ideological apparatuses, cause
the situation of women to appear natural. For Beauvoir, the
combination of these factors renders women's oppression rather
implausible, yet quite firmly entrenched, and, at times, seemingly
insurmountable.
However, while Beauvoir marvels at the phenomenon of
women' s othemess, she asserts that the Self/Other duality is itself a
fixed dichotomy. She states, "The category of the Other is as
primordial as consciousness itself' (xxviii); in Beauvoir' s words,
"Othemess is a fundamental category of human thought" (Beauvoir
xxix). She finds dualistic thinking inescapable and asserts that
oppositional, conflictual social relations are constituted by the action of
consciousness itself. The self, or the subject, must define hirnself in
relation to others as objects. To explain her reliance on a notion of
consciousness as dualistic, Beauvoir recounts Claude Levi-Strauss'
view that a passage from astate of Nature to astate of Culture is
contingent upon the ability to recognize dualisms in biological relations
(xxix). If humanity existed as a Mitsein, which Beauvoir defines as a
"fellowship based on solidarity and friendliness" (xxix), she claims this
passage would not be possible. The fact that Beauvoir finds a
fundamental duality in basic thinking and relations of consciousness
makes the conception of consciousness she derives from her readings of
Hegel's work an appropriate choice.
Although Beauvoir' s description of dualistic thinking draws
from Jean-Paul Sartre's divided model of consciousness, she transposes
the transcendent self, Being-for-Itself (pour-soi), and the immanent self,
Being-in-Itself (en soi), onto Hege!' s description of the self-alienated
9 Beauvoir could add, here, that existence of differences among women
frustrates solidarity, as weIl.
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spirit. 10 Beauvoir finds Hegel' s conception of consciousness useful.
She states, "Things become clear, on the contrary, if, following Hegel,
we find in consciousness itself a fundamental hostility toward every
other conseiousness; the subjeet ean be posed only in being opposed-
he sets hirnself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the
inessential, the objeet" (xxix). Thus, Beauvoir applies Sartrean
eategories to a Hegelian model of eonseiousness, which she then
transforms into agendered relation of eonseiousness. As Jo-Ann
Pilardi affirms, "But while Hegel's notion of the subjeet-objeet dialeetie
permitted the subjeet and objeet status to move from one person to
another, in Beauvoir' s analysis, in male-female relations, this dialeetieal
movement freezes. This means that eonsciousness itself is gendered as
a result of patriarehai relations" (29). Henee, Being-in-Itself, humans'
material, objeet-like existence, is eonneeted to the body, wherein
Beauvoir identifies women's sexualized, objectified, and subordinated
status. This eonseiousness stands in relation to Being-for-Itself,
humans' mobile, eonseious existenee, whieh is assoeiated with the mind
and with freedom. Therein, Beauvoir loeates the privileged subjeetivity
of men. Within this gendered dynamie, the two genders are in
opposition in their struggle for transeendence, yet the Other is
eontinually frustrated by the inability to eseape the inlDlanenee of this
prescribed position.
Beauvoir eharges Emmanuel Levinas with composing an
alterity whieh denies the reeiproeity of subjeet and objeet, a perspective
she identifies as a male point of view (xxviii). If her reading of Levinas
is accurate, this view is in alignment with Beauvoir' s notion of
eonflietual, oppositional eonsciousness neeessary to the becoming
10 Chanter elueidates the resulting tension ereated by Beauvoir' s
attempts to combine a "Sartrian [sie.] model of freedom-whieh
implies the ability of the individual to transeend any situation-and a
Hegelian model of the other-whieh implies an irresolvable eonfliet
between individuals" (50). In this instanee, Chanter' s foeus resides
with the eonsequent shortcomings of Beauvoir' s aeeount-espeeially
her failure to "adequately eoneeive of the interrelation between the role
of eulture and the question of Women' s status as other" due to this
"attempt to fuse two ineompatible theories" (49). Her analysis of the
juxtaposition of Sartre and Hegel in Beauvoir's work provides
insightful eommentary on the problematie aspeets of this maneuver,
ineluding the diffieulties surrounding Beauvoir' s use of the master-slave
dialeetie.
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subject' s attainment of subjecthood; she, indeed, maintains that the
Self/Other binary is fundamental. However, she maintains that the
gendered status of the Self/Other binary is a historically situated
relation based on the "assertion of male privilege" (xxviii). The
ensuing conflict leads to man's transcendence, but, without reciprocity,
it cannot lead to woman's transcendence. Thus, while Beauvoir's
construction of consciousness and the self-other relation remain
fundamental, the possibility for reciprocity between self and other (at
some time in the future) must be left open. The problem of women' s
frustrated transcendence would have no significance, according to
Beauvoir, if we were to accept the determined destiny of physiology,
psychology, or economy. The "truly feminine," however, is fashioned
by a male point of view (xli), which is itself fashioned to deny women
"full membership in the human race" (xli).
It follows, then, that while Beauvoir claims, "Here is to be
found the basic trait of woman: she is the Other in a totality of which
the components are necessary to one another" (xxxii), she does not
consign the gendered relation of consciousness to an inescapable
Cartesian duality. The position of woman is one of inferiority, yet it is
not an insurmountable subjugation since woman is inferior only insofar
as she remains in the context of patriarchy. It is bad faith, according to
Beauvoir, to view the plight of oppressed groups as a fixed state. She
states that "when an individual (or a group of individuals) is kept in a
situation of inferiority, the fact is that he is inferior. But the
significance of the verb to be must be rightly understood here: it is in
bad faith to give it a static value when it has the dynamic Hegelian
sense of 'to have become'" (xxxvi). She propounds: "Yes, women on
the whole are today inferior to men; that is, their situation affords them
fewer possibilities. The question is: should that state of affairs
continue?" (xxxvi) Thus, she asserts a dynamic sense of becoming and
the instability of a questionable set of conditions.
Throughout, Beauvoir stresses that this inferiority is not
accidental or pre-determined but a constitutive outcome of male-
dominated relations. She points out that "men profit in many more
subtle ways from the othemess, the alterity of woman" (xxvii). The
male symbolic order depends on the subordinate status of women to
remain intact, for if the Other remains suppressed and muted the Self
can make culture and history in the image of men, "the most mediocre
of [whom]," in her words, "feeIs hirnself a demigod as compared with
women" (xxxvi). Yet she points out the futility of reversing the binary:
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"If we are to gain understanding, we must get out of these ruts; we must
discard the vague notions of superiority, inferiority, equality which have
hitherto corrupted every discussion of the subject and start afresh"
(xxxix). Here, Beauvoir not only exceeds her "first wave" standing
through her rejection of masculinist notions of freedom and power, but
surpasses "second wave" agendas in her admonishment of such
reversals.
Although Beauvoir' s dynamic concept of freedom is presented
in existentialist terms, "transcendence"-the liberty of "becoming"- is
conceptually Hegelian: there is no happiness in "being at rest" (xl):
"Every subject plays his part as such specifically through exploits or
projects that serve as a mode of transcendence; he achieves liberty only
through a continual reaching out toward other liberties" (xl). She
explains, "There is no justification for present existence other than its
expansion into an indefinitely open future. Every time transcendence
falls back into immanence, stagnation, there is adegradation of
existence into the 'en-soi'-the brutish life of subjection to given
conditions-and of liberty into constraint and contingence" (xli).
Beauvoir, in fact, asserts that this is "a moral fault if the subject
consents to it"; and, if it is inflicted upon the subject, it leads to
"frustration and oppression" (xli). It is Beauvoir' s belief that "every
individual concerned to justify his existence feels that his existence
involves an undefined need to transcend himself, to engage in freely
chosen projects" (xli). She advances that woman is "a free and
autonomous being like all human creatures"; yet a being who "finds
herself living in a world where men compel her to assume the status of
the Other. They propose to stabilize her as object and to doom her to
immanence since her transcendence is overshadowed and forever
transcended by another ego (conscience) which is essential and
sovereign" (Beauvoir xli).
Beauvoir finds that there may be a temptation for woman to
assume the status of an object, but, as long as her status as the Other is
questioned and the answers remain lacking, the duality between the
sexes will lead to conflict, which may ultimately break the bonds of
femininity that constrain woman' s becoming. This philosophical
positioning suggests the ways in which alterity is later radicalized by
second and third generation feminisms and asserted as an oppositional
and disruptive force. In fact, the subversive potentiality of this
relationship is inherent in its constitution. Ofelia Schutte points out,
"The other, the foreigner, the stranger, is that person occupying the
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space of the subaltern in the culturally asymmetrical power relation, but
also those elements or dimensions of the self that unsettle or decenter
the ego's dominant, self-enclosed, territorialized identity" (54).
Additionally, by attributing the factor of subordination to the body
within this duality between the sexes, Beauvoir leaves open the
possibility for subversion to be connected to the body' s radical
potential. While this radical potentiality of the body is not a factor of
subversion Beauvoir herself commends, or even identifies, it is one
which follows from her assertion that what causes the conflict within
the sexed duality may provide radical force. It is amistake, in fact, to
diminish or ignore the corporeality of women' s alterity and deny the
potentiality in subverting subjugation through the "feminine" body,
which, through the process of gynesis, has come to represent the
unrepresentable, the repressed, and the terrifying.
In her analysis of Biology in Part I of The Second Sex,
Beauvoir notes that Aristotle' s notion of women as the weaker sex is
upheld in Hegel's text, The Philosophy ofNature, wherein he divides
the sexes into active and passive components. She states, "Hegel held
that the two sexes were of necessity different, the one active and the
other passive, and of course the female would be the passive one" (9).
She goes on to quote Hegel: "Thus man, in consequence of that
differentiation, is the active principle while the woman is the passive
principle because she remains undeveloped in her unity" (qtd. in
Beauvoir 9). Beauvoir rejects this conclusion, but she still finds that,
within the realm ofbiology, women's roles are crippling. However, it
is not the body per se that Beauvoir is rejecting. While the body should
not be the starting point for "wild narcissism," a phrase she implements
in a 1979 interview with Margaret Simons and Jessica Benjamin,
Beauvoir asserts that it should neither be a source of shame (342).
One role Beauvoir views with particular contempt in her
biological investigations is women' s maternal function. Although she
does not accept the difference between the sexes as a natural distinction
between activity and passivity, she identifies a division of roles between
the sexes in her analysis of mating and the activities that follow
procreation. Beauvoir explains: "The male is thus permitted to express
himself freely; the energy of the species is weIl integrated into his own
living activity. On the contrary, the individuality of the female is
opposed by the interest of the species; it is as if she were possessed by
foreign forces-alienated" (25). While she does not make explicit
reference to Hegel in her biological investigations, through this
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statement, Beauvoir invokes Hegel ~ s analysis of the pagan ethical world
in bis Phenomenology, wherein men may pass on to the realization of
universality by engaging with the world outside the family and women
are said to represent the family and be confined by its particularity.ll
Throughout tbis section on Biology, Beauvoir exposes prevailing
beliefs about women's bodies for critique and rejection. In the course
of her analysis, however, she locates no positive and liberating
substance in the corporeal and finds only oppression in matemal
functions. In maternity, woman is thought to achieve her ultimate
fulfillment, yet Beauvoir contends that there is nothing natural in an
obligation to reproduce, nor is having a child a privileged
accomplishment. She refuses to affirm the connection between female
desire and motherhood. As Linda M.G. Zerilli puts it, "Beauvoir's
subversive appropriation of the dominant discourse of motherhood
transforms maternity from a self-evident expression of female nature
into something strange and profoundly unnatural" (122). Thus, with
regard to the body, as it is situated, Beauvoir maintains that women's
roles remain limited and limiting.
Beauvoir' s analysis of the female/maternal body succeeds in
revealing the myths that have dominated male philosophy throughout
the ages. For instance, the purportedly passive role of the female in
reproduction justifies, for Aristotle, the place of women within
patriarehai institutions (Beauvoir 8). Similarly, Beauvoir notes, Hegel
affirms this conception of the difference between the sexes (male as
active and female as passive) and its corresponding logic in
reproductive functions (9). Beauvoir concludes of mammalian females
witbin the realm of biology: "At times when she is free from matemal
servitude she can now and then equal the male..." (23). Unlike
women's place in childrearing, the man's role remains separate and
distinct. She states, "... he keeps himself apart and maintains his
individuality within himself' (23). Beauvoir continues, "In this respect
Hegel is right in seeing the subjective element in the male, while the
female remains wrapped up in the species" (23). Genevieve Lloyd
claims that it is Beauvoir' s commentary on female biology that
elucidates the conflict between being a free subject, reaching for
11 The limited role of women is also discussed by Hegel in The
Philosophy ofRight, where, as in the Phenomenology, Hegel invokes
the figure of Antigone to elucidate this. However, in The Philosophy of
Right, Hegers focus is on women's role in the modern world, rather
than in the pagan world of the Phenomenology.
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transcendence, and being a body which drags this subject back to a
"natural" existence (306). Lloyd asserts, "It is as if the female body [in
Beauvoir's account] is an intrinsic obstacle to transcendence, nlaking
woman a 'prey ofthe species'" (306).
Even as Beauvoir "defamiliarizes the familiar" and
"denaturalizes the natural" (Zerilli 122), she explores the possibility
that menopause frees women from "the iron grasp of the species"
(Beauvoir 31). She expounds: "Woman is now delivered from the
servitude imposed by her female nature, but she is not to be likened to a
eunuch, for her vitality is unimpaired. And what is more, she is no
longer the prey of overwhelming forces; she is herself, she and her body
are one" (31). Beauvoir questions the status of post-menopausal
women as a possible "third sex" (31); she proposes that women in this
stage of life are "no longer females" (31). She remarks, "Often, indeed,
this release from female physiology is expressed in a health, a balance,
a vigor that they lacked before" (31). Thus, Beauvoir's seeming
rejection of female corporeality resides largely in her critique of
matemal roles.
These roles are socially and ideologically situated, however.
And though Beauvoir does not suggest that women attain transcendence
by identifying with their bodies, she is certainly not advocating a
universal rejection of the body. She states, "... the body is not a thing,
it is a situation ... ; it is the instrument of our grasp upon the world, a
limiting factor for our projects" (Beauvoir 34). Beauvoir insists upon
woman' s "power to choose between the assertion of her transcendence
and her alienation as object" (50). Woman exists in a world of ideas
and values that hamper her transcendence, yet Beauvoir believes that
she has the capacity for freedom. Thus, Beauvoir's account ofthe
matemal body does not suggest that being physiologically female
presents an insurmountable obstacle to the existentialist ideal of
transcendence. Rather, it results in a useful theory of bodily
alienation. 12
12 As Kristana Arp suggests, "One of the primary ways, if not the
primary way that women are conditioned to accept their oppression is
through bodily alienation. And the alienation of women in their bodies
and from their bodies has been effected through male ideology. For
these reasons, Beauvoir' s concept of bodily alienation is a major
contribution to feminist thought" (174).
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Much later in the text, following her reflections on the
alternative lesbian's life, in which she locates potential in the
independence of the lesbian, who is defined not by her "erotic life" but
by what Beauvoir calls the "whoIe group of responsibilities [lesbians]
are forced to assurne because they dispense with men" (421), she
embarks on a more thorough consideration of forces within the realms
of marriage and motherhood (Part V, "Situation"). Though she
concedes that marriage is becoming a more egalitarian union which is
entered into by independent, consenting persons, whose obligations are
reciprocal, and that women are no longer limited to the reproductive
function, she maintains that marriage still, to some degree, perpetuates
the past (425). It is appropriate that Beauvoir's extended engagement
with Hegelian tropes takes place within this realm of the symbolic,
conflating, as it does, women's potential reproductive capacity-or her
"natural" and self-fulfilling roles as wife and mother-with social
function and ontological status. Hence, it is here, in "The Married
Woman," that Beauvoir most fully engages with two key Hegelian
moments that further express the self-other divide: the meeting of
human and divine law in the ethical realm and the master-slave
dialectic.
Beauvoir's Otherness in Hegel's Ethical Realm
The first Hegelian reference Beauvoir incorporates in her
analysis of marriage is the dialectic of particular and universal, or the
opposition between human and divine law, in the ethical realm. She
refers to "the very doctrine enunciated by Hegel when he maintains that
woman's relations as mother and wife are basically general and not
individual" (435) and notes that only man transcends "toward the
universal as worker and citizen" (435). Beauvoir also comments on the
biological, or ontologieal, basis on which Hege!' s justification rests. In
Hege!' s analysis of the family, woman, because of her nature, both
represents and is confined to the dark, lower world of shadows-the
realm of the family and divine law. Woman is not alienated from nature
since she does not experience a confrontation, or contradiction, between
herself and first nature, or particularity. She is denied her dialectical
development, since this requires the overcoming of natural existence
through the conscious risk of death for recognition in the community.
Woman is responsible to the family and, thus, unlike men, cannot
proceed beyond its realm. Therefore, woman always remains ethical
substance without self-consciousness. She only achieves knowledge as
intuition of divine law and never achieves the abstract individuality of a
citizen; she remains confined to her particularity. Hegel explains: "But
144
because it is only as a citizen that he is actual and substantial, the
individual, so far as he is not a citizen but belongs to the Family, is only
an unreal impotent shadow" (270). Since woman is confined to this
world of shadows, or the lower world of the family, and remains
trapped within the'realm of first nature, or particularity, her self-
development, or transcendence, is halted.
The progression of human consciousness from the particularity
of the family to the realization of universality is limited to the male sex.
Hegel states:
The brother is the merrlber of the Family in whom its Spirit
becomes an individuality which turns towards another sphere,
and passes over into the consciousness of universality. The
brother leaves this immediate, elemental, and therefore, stricdy
speaking, negative ethicallife of the Family, in order to
acquire and produce the ethicallife that is conscious of itself
and actual. He passes from the divine law, within whose
sphere he lived, over to human law. But the sister becomes, or
the wife remains, the head of the household and the guardian
of divine law. (275)
As in the Phenomenology, Beauvoir's analysis recognizes the
husband' s "position of moral and social superiority" (Beauvoir 463).
She elaborates: "He has the advantage of superior culture or, at any
rate, professional training; since adolescence he has taken an interest in
world affairs-they are his affairs-he knows something of law, he
keeps up with politics, he belongs to a party, to a union, to social
organizations; as worker and citizen his thinking is related to action"
(463). For Beauvoir, social conditions are the cause of this injustice, or
this "basic inequality" of the sexes. In her words, "But the basic
inequality still lies in the fact that the husband finds concrete self-
realization in work and action ..." (480). She proclaims, "[women's]
miscellaneous information does not constitute culture" (463); but it is
"intellectual technique" women lack-not intellect (463). Beauvoir
continues: "That is why their husbands, even though of comparatively
mediocre ability, will easily dominate them and prove themselves to be
in the right even when in the wrong" (463). As is the case with Hegel's
rationale, Beauvoir claims, "In masculine hands logic is often a form of
violence, a sly kind of tyranny..." (463). Thus, she exposes the
justification of patriarchy in her discussion of Hegel' s ethical realm,
even though she does not overtly admonish Hege!' s masculine logic.
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This Hegelian reference plays a provocative role within
Beauvoir's own analysis. It reveals that freedom, as it has been
manifested in patriarchal society, is male and that this is justified in
Philosophy and in various other masterdiscourses by biological
assumptions. By locating an ideological justification of patriarchy in
Hege!'s Phenomenology, Beauvoir may be locating both the forces of
oppression and the forces of subversion. In drawing out tensions that
exist in that text, Beauvoir is defying Hege!' s narrative. Beauvoir' s
denial of subjectivity within Hegelian concepts and narratives
challenges the symbolic order from within. Like Marx, she utilizes
Hegel, but with new purpose. 13 And, like many feminist writers,
Beauvoir views Hege!' s text as a point of contestation.
Beauvoir's Master-Slave Dialectic
Beauvoir's second major reference to the Phenomenology is
the master-slave dialectic, the Hegelian paradigm most frequently
revisited in Beauvoir studies. It is first set forth as a general sexed
dynamic in Part 11. Therein, Beauvoir asserts, "Certain passages in the
argument employed by Hegel in defining the master to slave apply
much better to the relation of man to woman" (64). But it is within the
realm of the marriage relation that Beauvoir suggests its "'most concrete
application" (481). She claims, "Very often it is not enough for the
husband to be approved of and admired, for him to be counselor and
guide; he issues commands, he plays lord and master" (465).14 By
13 Further, like Marx, it is clear from the connections she draws between
supply and demand and relations between the sexes that Beauvoir fiods
economic transfonnation essential to any substantive and lasting
refonnulation of such relations, even if it is only a part of this
refonnulation. For woman's greater involvement in "species life"
frustrates her transcendence, but it is the prevailing modes of
socioeconomic organization that limit her "projects" and "exploits" to
this realm of domestic and maternal activity, or cut woman offfrom the
potentiallived meanings of her subjectivity. In the last paragraph of
this section, Beauvoir directly states that women' s liberation, indeed,
"must be collective, and it requires first of all that economic evolution
of women's condition be accomplished" (627). For Beauvoir, both
economic change and the concomitant struggle to "disrupt cultural
assumptions about woman as the passive bearer of species teleology"
(Zerilli 119) are collective enterprises.
14 Giyen the direct nature of these statements, it is curious that Eva
Lundgren-Gothlin claims that Beauvoir "does not locate man as master
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referencing the master-slave dialectic, Beauvoir contends that the
subjugation of women by men gives rise to the condition of mastery and
servitude within marriage. However, while the Hegelian master-slave
dialectic does apply in this general, yet limited, sense, there are vital
aspects of this dynamic which do not apply. This may initially appear
to be simply a partial appropriation of Hegel, but these absences give
her Hegelian reference more significance than may be readily
apparent. 15
One element of the master-slave dialectic instnlmental in
social theory and absent in Beauvoir' s analysis is the reversal which
takes place. In Hege!' s analysis, the master' s desire to be recognized is
frustrated by the act of subjection, and this precipitates areversal within
the master-slave relationship. The master cannot attain pure self-
consciousness because the recognition necessary for the movement
from consciousness to self-consciousness is only achieved by the
exercise of force. Any recognition gained from the slave, whose fear of
death causes him to yield to the master' s will, is a forced recognition.
The slave recognizes the master only because he is obliged to do so;
therefore, the recognition of servant is the reflection of the master' s will
back to hirnself through the will of the slave, which is really nothing
more than the will of the master. The master, recognizing hirnself, does
not gain recognition at alle The slave, however, experiences the dread
of human existence-the threat of Nothingness, or the negation of
being-and understands human reality better than the master does.
Hegel states, "But just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the
reverse of what it wants to be, so too servitude in its consummation will
really turn into the opposite of what it immediately is; as a
and woman as slave in this [Hegelian master-slave] dialectic" (72). I
will return to this shortly.
15 While Chanter claims that Beauvoir' s "existentialist bias... results in
a failure to take the dynamic aspects of Hege!' s dialectical thinking
seriously" (66); questions how Hege!'s master-slave relation, in
Beauvoir' s mind, applies better to the relation between man and woman
(Chanter 67); and ascribes fundamental problems to Beauvoir's
assimilation of Hegel and Sartre; I will identify the richness in
Beauvoir' s text, departing from Chanter' s assertion that Beauvoir' s
"existentialist standpoint" prevents Beauvoir from taking full account of
Hegel's master-slave dialectic. Chanter's notion that there may be an
"internal contradiction" (72) yields an insightful reading, but does not
explore the potential in Beauvoir's text I elucidate herein.
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consciousness forced back into itself, it will withdraw into itself and be
transformed into a truly independent consciousness" (Hegel 117). So it
is finally the slave who undergoes a significant movement of Spirit and,
in fact, experiences the first moment of freedom. In Beauvoir' s
analysis, woman as subordinate or slave does not experience even this
momentary transcendence.
A second aspect of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic which
does not exist in Beauvoir' s discussion of marriage is the crucial
importance of labor. It is through labor that the slave is able to achieve
successful extemalization of self in the Phenomenology. The slave,
who receives no recognition, exercises his own will on the extemal
world and overcomes the othemess of the physical material world
through labor and the development of the skills it entails. Thus, in
laboring for another without recognition of himself as a self, the slave,
the bearer of physicallabor, achieves independence through the
acquisition of knowledge and the projection of himself into the future
through productive labor. The slave makes the world other than it was
and, hence, changes himself, whereas the master only changes through
the slave. This extemalization of self allows the slave to become other
through work. The process of labor and its projection into the social
world yields positive results for the slave in that he realizes seltbood
through work and the permanence of its results.
The wife in Beauvoir's The Second Sex is condemned to the
torturous labor of housework and produces no durable products, so she
never experiences these positive results. Beauvoir claims that the
wife's labor is analogous to the torture of Sisyphus. Camus describes
this torture: "The gods had condemned Sisyphus to ceaselessly rolling a
rock to the top of a mountain, whence the stone would fall back of its
own weight. They had thought with some reason that there is no more
dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless labor" (88). Similarly, the
wife "makes nothing," and "simply perpetuates the present," according
to Beauvoir (451). In the endless repetition of housework, the wife
engages in this "futile and hopeless" attempt to halt decay. Beauvoir
calls this negative activity a "denial of life" (451). She elaborates: "The
woman's work within the home gives her no autonomy; it is not directly
useful to society, it does not open out on the future, it produces nothing.
It takes on meaning and dignity only as it is linked with existent beings
who reach out beyond themselves, transcend themselves, toward society
in production and action" (456). The husband, on the other hand, "is
first a citizen, a producer, secondly a husband" (456).
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Thus, the master-slave dialectic in the situation of marriage in
The Second Sex is quite divergent from that of the Phenomenology.
Beauvoir's reference is limited to the fact of subordination and the
general frustration of recognition within the marriage relationship.
There is no reversal between husband and wife, no achievement of self-
consciousness through labor, and, although desired, no transcendence
for wife. Eva Lundgren-Gothlin claims that the seeming limitations of
Beauvoir's reference can be explained by viewing woman as outside the
process of recognition entirely. She states:
I am therefore claiming, in contrast to other scholars, that
while Beauvoir uses the Hegelian master-slave dialectic to explain the
origins of oppression, she does not locate man as master and woman as
slave in this dialectic. Instead, woman is seen as not participating in the
process of recognition, a fact that explains the unique nature of her
oppression. Although the man is the master, the essential consciousness
in relation to woman, the woman is not a slave in relation to him. This
makes their relationship more absolute, and non-dialectical, and it
explains why woman is the absolute Other.
(Lundgren-Gothlin 72)
In her interpretation of Beauvoir's use of the master-slave dialectic, both
master and slave are male, as in Hegel's rendering, while woman remains
absolute other. Here, Lundgren-Gothlin emphasizes that this relation is
non-dialectical, as the master and slave do not authentically engage in
the process of recognition; further, in a footnote, she exposes critics who
believe that "Beauvoir did not take the time to learn her Hegel
thoroughly" (277). These are, indeed, useful observations. However, in
contrast to Lundgren-Gothlin, I am not willing to part with the notion
that Beauvoir intended the master-slave relation to be a sexed dynamic
or that Beauvoir consciously used it only up to a certain point, culling
from it what was useful to her. My reading of this partial application of
the master-slave dialectic draws significance from the idea that, in
Beauvoir's formulation, the fact of subordination may not be necessary
for transcendence. Indeed, there is no reversal in Beauvoir's dynarnic
because master and slave do not engage in authentie recognition.
Further, there is no successful extemalization of self for the wife-
therefore, no validation of "women's work," so to speak, insofar as it is
tedious, unpaid, and functions only to serve others. Thus, by applying
Hegel' s master-slave dialectic in such a limited fashion, Beauvoir
emphasizes that there are no positive results from subjugation for the
wife, and certainly not through the labor of a wife.
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In her earlier critique of historical materialism, Beauvoir
focuses on how the interplay of women ~ s economic and social
oppression is largely perpetuated, in her estimation, by domestic slavery
and women' s lack of participation in production. However, she stresses
that economic factors do not suffice to explain or remedy the situation
of women. Beauvoir notes, "If the human consciousness had not
included the original category of the Other and an original aspiration to
dominate the Other, the invention of the bronze tool could not have
caused the oppression of women" (58). Thus, although Beauvoir asserts
that women's emancipation is, in part, tied to her attainment of equal
rights and her involvement in large-scale production, or projects of her
own choosing, and while a limited engagement in domestic labor may
be necessary, Beauvoir's treatment of labor, in the master-slave relation
and beyond, serves to reassert her claim that women' s situation is
complex and may not be rectified through labor, and especially through
domestic labor. By stating that it is the "imperialism of the human
consciousness... seeking always to exercise its sovereignty in objective
fashion" (58), which limits women's transcendence, Beauvoir once
again posits a Hegelian model of consciousness.
Ultimately, by irnplernenting resources frorn Hegel~s
Phenomenology, Beauvoir illustrates the fact that women's liberation,
or transcendence, cannot be achieved within the Hegelian narrative,
which is still, to a large extent, the narrative of our patriarchal world. It
seems Beauvoir utilizes the Hegelian system to expose this narrative of
patriarchal ideology which women must collectively resist in order to
achieve the conditions that will allow for the affirmation of women' s
freedom, or transcendence. 16 Perhaps she approaches Hegel' s system
with a view towards illuminating the complex and far-reaching effects
of patriarchal power and its ideological tentacles, but also towards
locating the means by which to change women's lives. But the question
remains: How can this be achieved within this conflictual model of
consciousness? Without rescinding her previous claim that
consciousness is essentially combative, Beauvoir suggests that women' s
16 Here, Elaine P. Miller might agree. In her reading, she claims that
Beauvoir's treatment of Hegel (in The Second Sex and The Ethics of
Ambiguity taken together) and, in particular, Beauvoir' s "resistance to
the Hegelian sublation of particularity into the universality and
neutrality of the ethical" in The Ethics ofAmbiguity, foregrounds
lrigaray' s concern for the developrnent of "specifically feminine values
and even a feminine subjectivity" (122).
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emancipation is a future possibility. And, despite the many forces
denying women's transcendence, she alludes to this hope when she
suggests, "The free woman is just being born" (Beauvoir 715). Thus,
Beauvoir leaves the question of the self-other schematic open to
interpretive possibilities, even as she maintains a position of
intransigence regarding its basic constitution.
Conclusion
Beauvoir recognizes that it is in the interest of men to retain
their position within patriarchal societies and develop systems of
thought, arnong them gender, and perpetuate tradition in the form of
conventional values and standard roles, which, in turn, help to perpetuate
existing relations of power. In the course of elucidating the concept of
the Other, Beauvoir confronts these constructs and unmasks them. She
separates the dynamics of gender, in asense, from the biological and the
metaphysical by exposing the belief systems that support dominant ideas
about wornen as Other. Her efforts to establish the indeterminacy of
gender and its status as an ideological construction-the effect of
socialization and not the necessary outcome of some pregiyen interior
essence or the fabrication of the woman' s will, or choice-raise
questions about the ultimate injustice the Self/Other binary reinforces
and provide important breakthroughs for later feminist projects.
Building upon Beauvoir' s observations, ludith Butler, for instance, calls
into question the stability and coherence of the very category of woman,
not only as an identity construction, but as a foundation for feminist
politics, since this category takes shape within the context of a matrix
that oppositionally and hierarchically defines gender through the
cornpulsory practices of gender identity and invariably supports relations
of psychic and political subordination. 17 The resources of Beauvoir' s
concept of otherness have indeed proven invaluable.
Additionally, the self-other problematic that Beauvoir
centralizes leaves space for the Other to be developed into a radical
position of alterity and femininity, as a construct, to be turned against
the systems that create and perpetuate it as an instrument of oppression.
"French feminists," for example, have attempted to radicalize alterity
rather than reject the "otherness" of women as a plight to be
"overcorne.,,18 These feminists, including Irigaray in her early work,19
17 In Gender Trouble.
18 The developrnent of concepts, such as femin ite and l'ecriture
feminine exernplify this approach to otherness. Note, for instance,
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locate a site for resistance in this othemess and reconceive of alterity as
a radical force or positionality with the potential to destabilize
hegemonie systems. Transformations of othemess as radical do not
succeed as reversals of the Self/Other binary, however. If they retain
hierarchieal relations between the sexes, they are incomplete alterations.
In transforming Beauvoir' s account of sexist relations, an attempt must
be made to reconceptualize, or even reconstitute, relations between the
sexes, or, rather, between any subjects in hierarchical relation. But how
do we break free from dominating fomls of power? Is the necessary
form of power one that subjugates?20 These are questions
contemporary feminists continue to address.
While some feminists recognize the vitality of the concept of
woman as the Other and attempt to posit this force against a divided
model of human relations, it remains important for others to reconsider
the necessity for antagonism inherent in Beauvoir' s formulation of
consciousness, as Irigaray attempts in her later development of the
concept of the universal as twO.21 The importance of overcoming this
problem is alluded to by Kelly Oliver when she asserts, "Until we can
conceive of a true relation between subject and other, we cannot
conceive of ethics" (1). Yet Beauvoir herself does not question the
dualistic, oppositional thinking that generates such categories.
Throughout The Second Sex, she remains committed to the antagonistic
model of consciousness that she has derived from her reading of Hege!.
Helene Cixous' s "The Laugh of the Medusa," which is considered a
manifesto for I'ecriture feminine.
19 For example, "This Sex Which Is Not One," where Irigaray asserts
feminine autoeroticism against masculine economies of sexuality and
general phallocentric oppression.
20 See Butler' s The Psychic Life ofPower.
21 In I Love To You, Irigaray attempts to replace the logic of One with
the logic of two, thereby disrupting major systems that order
knowledges and discourses, such as the phallic economy of the
Hegelian dialectic. This entails the development of a sexuate economy,
for Irigaray claims that sexual difference must be accounted for in any
constitutive ontology of renewal and revolution. The
incommensurability of sexed exchange disrupts the "universal" and
offers a model of negotiation, reciprocity, recognition, and mediation
between subjects.
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Beauvoir' s employment of Hegelian paradigms and narratives
is tempered, however, by the fact that she finds that Hegel, in some
instances, does not assert the truth, but, rather, makes many of the very
claims she rejects and demystifies in the course of her exposition of the
Other. Not only does she derive what she deerns a fitting model of
consciousness and the master-slave power dynamic from Hegel, but she
utilizes Hegel to reveal the inner workings of patriarchal systems as she
exposes the justification of subordination in the master-slave relation
and the rationale for patriarchy in Hege!' s ethical realm. Throughout
her engagement with Hegel, as weH as other masculinist philosophers,
Beauvoir locates useful descriptions for her own critique. That Freud
and others are describing the mental representation of a social reality
and not reality itself did not escape Beauvoir. Yet she maintains an
allegiance to certain ideas that limit her theory of alterity in irreparable
ways-above all, to a construction of othemess that maintains a focus
on antagonism rather than mediation and reciprocity. Yet the very
formulation of the concept of the social other and its status as gendered
is itself radical, given its historicallocation.
In conclusion, the relationship between feminists and their
male predecessors is indeed complex. The philosophical texts of our
male predecessors have represented and yielded dominant modes of
thought that are ingrained in both the profound and the political, our
philosophical underpinnings and our everyday experiences. Rather than
sinlply appropriate or combat phallocentric thought, third generation
feminists position themselves in a dialogue with their philosophical
predecessors. Taking clues from Beauvoir, thinkers such as Irigaray
and Kristeva simultaneously interrogate philosophical tradition and
employ various resources they have located and transformed. There is
a struggle: for the reclamation of a corpus of work that is rich with
philosophical insights and for the rejection of the underlying patriarchal
themes of these texts that exist in the logic of our culture, economy, and
everyday lives. This approach yields more than a methodology for third
wave feminist projects, but it may hold meaning beyond these
enterprises. Beauvoir begins to unfold this story, and later generations
further radicalize it.
BYkeeping the relationship of self and other in motion,
conceptually, we may find that rather than a cruel struggle of oppressive
and hostile forces in a linear process of becoming, as in Hege!' s
dialectic of Aufhebung, the self-other relation, set free from strict sex
and gender categories and a conflictual model of consciousness, can be
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reconceived as an affirmative interplay of forces, or a dialectical
oscillation. The richness of corporeal paradigms developed by later
thinkers, such as Irigaray, allude to the ways we can begin to rethink
these relations.22 Perhaps we may even glimpse the potential for
rethinking these relations in the philosophical space between the corpus
of feminist writings and the masterdiscourses they engage.
The University of Alabama Jennifer Purvis
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